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Abstract
In this paper corporate environmental management is perceived in terms of reaction
on or anticipation of incentives emitted by external stakeholders. Corporate
responsiveness is the extent to which a company is willing to reconcile the
requirements made by external stakeholders with its own purposes and to integrate
them in their environmental strategy. Some building stones for a theoretical
framework for analysing the relationships between companies and external
stakeholders are brought up. The dependent variable is corporate responsiveness, and
four parameters are discussed:
• the specific aspects of corporate environmental management that affects the
interests of particular stakeholders: environmental impacts, internal environmental
management, and various side-effects:
• the nature of the incentives to the company enacted by the external stakeholders,
in particular the type of motivational driving force to which they are appealing:
economic rationality, legal compliance, or social responsibility;
• the extent of the company’s environmental consciousness corresponding to the
type of driving force addressed by the external stakeholders;
• the mutual dependencies in the relationship between the company and its external
stakeholders.
Keywords: environmental management, sustainable development, stakeholders,
environmental strategy.
1. Introduction
Almost all authors on corporate environmental management and strategy recognise
the need for sustainable development, usually by endorsing the analysis of the
Brundtland report “Our Common Future” (WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT
AND DEVELOPMENT 1987). Most of these authors, not only the academics among
them, but also those with an industrial background, acknowledge the indispensable
contribution of industry to this purpose.
With respect to the nature of the required changes, the visions are not homogeneous.
Focusing on the main dimension, they diverge from the “eco-efficiency” to the
“system change imperative” (SCHOT, BRAND & FISCHER 1997). Eco-efficiency means
that industry should adapt to changing ecological circumstances and societal
responses to it. Successful adaptations will be rewarded with relative cost savings,
competitive advantages for seizing market opportunities, and smooth relationships
with government and environmental agencies. These changes may be rather
profound, but the basic mechanisms and rationalities of doing business remain
3unaffected. An exponent of the eco-efficiency view is SCHMIDHEINY (1992), the
spokesman of the (World) Business Council for Sustainable Development who
coined the term “eco-efficiency”. Another prominent author, SHRIVASTAVA (1994;
1995; 1996) has an open eye for the “win-win-situations” stemming from an eco-
efficiency view too, while stressing the ongoing institutional transformation towards
a post-industrial or risk society.
According to the system chance imperative, the pursuit of eco-efficiency is an
obstruction to real sustainable development. As long as the economy is dominated by
corporations who’s main objective is making (short term) profits or returns on
investments, sustainable development will remain an illusion. In stead, the economy
must be integrated into larger systems which are guided by the rationalities of
ecology, equity, and futurity. An exponent of this view is Gladwin (e.g. GLADWIN ET
AL 1995).
The opposite views are often presented in terms of contrasting paradigms. The eco-
efficiency view is associated with the maintenance of the established managerial
paradigm, while the system change view involves a paradigm shift from
“antropocentrism” to “ecocentrism” (e.g. PURSER ET AL 1995). KIVISAARI & LOVIO
(1996) distinguish two dimensions in the paradigm debate: different visions of the
human-nature-relationship and a societal dimension.
The present paper concentrates on the small steps which are feasible in the short run.
In this sense it comes close to the eco-efficiency view, but without the implication
that more radical system changes can be avoided in the long run. The basic theme of
this paper is a view on corporate environmental management - activities aimed at
environmentally related purposes - as reaction on or anticipation of incentives from
external stakeholders, third parties who’s interests are affected by environmentally
related behaviour of companies.
This paper concerns a theoretical framework with several examples taken from
practise. However, this is work in progress and much remains to be done.
2. Corporate environmental management
2.1 Working definitions
The central subject of this paper is corporate environmental management. Although
there is some general understanding of the meaning of this term, much conceptual
confusion is left. First, this paper abstains from the discussion whether a company
acts as a consistent organisational actor, and whether it should be studied as such
(perhaps not!). With this restriction mentioned, the most generic term is corporate
behaviour. When analysing environmentally related behaviour, the first distinction is
whether the company is aware of the relevance for environmental issues, or not. It is
assumed that companies are exercising some kind of control over behaviour that is
perceived as environmentally related, and this control is called corporate
environmental management. Another distinction is between external and internal
oriented environmental management, which is addressed below. To the extent that
4corporate environmental management is based on a consistent vision and involves a
consistent set of measures, the term corporate environmental policy applies, which is
used here as an “ex-ante” concept. The concept of corporate environmental strategy
is used here as an “ex post” concept - “a pattern in a stream of decisions and/or
actions” - in the sense it is used by Mintzberg (MINTZBERG 1987; MINTZBERG &
WATERS 1990).
So, the following working definitions are used in this paper. They allow conceptual
distinctions, but the actual application of these terms and concepts in the following
text is still somewhat arbitrary.
• Environmentally related behaviour encompasses all corporate activity (or
refraining from it) that has direct or indirect effects on sustainable development,
irrespective of the fact whether the company is aware of these effects or not.
• Corporate environmental management is the exercising of control over
environmentally related behaviour, which implies recognition of it as such.
• Corporate environmental policy is used as an ex ante concept for the whole
package of measures taken by a company in the context of its environmental
management.
• Corporate environmental strategy is used as an ex post concept for the more or
less constant patterns within the company’s environmentally related behaviour.
2.2 Aspects of corporate environmental management
Corporate environmental management is studied here from an external stakeholder
perspective. The following classification of aspects of environmental management
with three main categories is used: (1) direct environmental impacts; (2) internal
environmental care; (3) side-effects on other management objectives.
Many classifications of corporate environmental management are presented in the
literature. Some are sub-classifications of the categories mentioned here (as will be
demonstrated below), while others are conceptualised from a different angle, such as
a classification according to managerial functions, like manufacturing, marketing,
R&D, and purchase (cf. Bansal 1993, cited in BHARGAVA & WELFORD 1996).
2.2.1 Environmental impacts
From an external stakeholder perspective corporate environmental management
involves activities which are either directly aimed at control or reduction of
environmental impacts, or activities that contribute to it in an indirect way. The
former still includes a large variety of activities, which are subject of further
classification. Current sub-classifications are based on the distinction between
processes and products, or on input - throughput - output - models.
In the processes-products distinction (e.g. Beaumont et al 1993, cited in BHARGAVA
& WELFORD 1996) the process side is focused on production technology: the
emissions and energy use by the company itself. The product side is focused on the
product design: the use of scarce natural resources, the environmental burden of the
5product in its use stage, and the possibilities of sustainable removal of the product in
the disposal stage.
An input-throughput-output model (e.g. WILLIAMS, MEDHURST & DREW 1993) gives
rise to another sub-classification. Input concerns raw materials, intermediate
products, water, energy, and means of production; throughput concerns the eco-
efficiency of the production processes; and output concerns the products in their use
and disposal stages, as well as the emissions and the waste generated by the
company.
2.2.2 Internal environmental management
Apart from the aspects directly aimed at the control of environmental impacts
(external points of reference), corporate environmental management also involves
aspects with internal points of reference, which are meant to facilitate the direct
activities. Internal environmental management (in Dutch it is “environmental care”)
is a generic term for organisational, administrative, technical, and informational
measures taken in support of activities directly aimed at control or reduction of
environmental impacts, including compliance with legal regulations (e.g. BRESSERS
ET AL 1995). Environmental management systems are regular tools for effective and
efficient environmental care, which minimise the probability of incidents and sheer
fiasco’s (e.g. NETHERWOOD 1996). The Dutch Ministry of the Environment has
introduced a scheme with the basic requirements of such a system, from an
environmental policy statement to internal and external reporting and auditing
(TWEEDE KAMER 1989). The popular environmental certificates, such as EMAS, ISO
14001, and BS 7750, are quality certificates of these environmental management
systems (e.g. STARKEY 1996)
2.2.3 Side-effects
Finally, corporate environmental management involves some special aspects, which
cannot be classified unequivocally as direct or indirect control of environmental
impacts, because they contribute obviously to other various purposes. This
heterogeneous class of corporate environmental management aspects, of which an
incomplete listing is presented below, is indicated here as “side-effects”.
• The financial costs and benefits of measures of environmental protection - the
issue of the balance sheet - are obvious points of reference. A common experience
is that short term expenditures are always clear, while benefits are hard to
quantify, uncertain, and only to be effected in the long run. The indirect costs of
not taking particular measures are also uncertain and hard to quantify. As a result,
measures yielding short term financial gains, such as waste minimisation and
energy conservation, are often granted with priority in environmental action plans
(e.g. BORPHY 1996).
6• Legal compliance is another obvious point of reference for many environmentally
related measures. Companies have to comply with many laws and regulations
concerning their environmentally related behaviour, requirements in their
environmental permits, and legally prescribed product characteristics. Legal
requirements are often directed at reduction of environmental burdens, either
through prescriptions of means, or prescriptions of ends. In the Netherlands,
government has considered to impose the obligation to install environmental
management systems to certain categories of companies (TWEEDE KAMER 1989).
When companies take protective measures, it is not always possible to tell which
is the primary aim and which is the side-effect: reduction of environmental
burdens or legal compliance.
• Market opportunities or competitive advantages: sustainability as unique
selling point for products and services. The literature contains many famous
examples of companies prospering through their pro-active and well publicised
environmental strategies, such as The Body Shop, 3M Company, Volvo Car
Corporation, and Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Ice Creams (e.g. SCHMIDHEINY 1992;
SHRIVASTAVA 1996). There are several ways to appeal to environmentally
conscious customers and consumers: (a) the product or service is a tool in support
of sustainable behaviour, such as energy efficient machines and instruments; (b)
the product (or service) can be called ‘green’ because of the low environmental
burden in the production and disposal stage, such as chlorine free paper; (c) the
producer’s contribution to sustainable product chain management, from cradle to
grave. An automobile, for instance, can fit all of these descriptions, for reason of
its low fuel consumption, the raw materials used, its design for deconstruction,
and the ISO 14001 requirements to which the manufacturer complies.
• The company’s public environmental image is another point of reference for
environmentally related measures. A positive public image may serve as a unique
selling point, while a negative public image may repel (potential) customers. A
good environmental image can result from sound environmental management.
However, it may also be influenced by advertising of ones environmental
performance, and even by window dressing, when a company is pushing an
environmental image that is not justified by its actual performance. On the other
hand, a company may spend much effort in preventing or mending a negative
public image, for instance Shell after the Brent Spar affair or Exxon after the
Exxon Valdez disaster. Legal compliance and publicity about it are major
constituents of a company’s environmental image, as compliance and non-
compliance are easy to communicate to the public.
Other aspects are often derived from the ones mentioned here. Environmental
problems and a negative environmental image are complications or barriers for
contacts with the world outside (government, residents, environmental movement),
because it generates distrust. Other parties must be convinced of the company’s
sincerity over and over again. A chemical company in the Netherlands has suffered
for many years from the aftermath of a number of environmental incidents and the
resulting negative image, even with respect to its position on the labour market
(SCHRAMA 1997A).
73. Driving forces of corporate environmental management
3.1 Three basic driving forces
The theoretical framework outlined in this paper is based on the “bounded rational
actor model” for understanding the behaviour of social actors - companies in this
case - including the perceived requirements for self maintenance within a given
societal context. The word “understanding” is used here in the sense of “verstehen”
as introduced by Max Weber. For this purpose three basic types of driving forces or
motivations are distinguished, corresponding with general classifications of social
steering mechanisms, notably the theory of policy instruments (BRESSERS & KLOK
1988; KLOK 1991): (1) economic rationality; (2) legal compliance; (3) social
responsibility.
Of these three types of driving forces, economic rationality is easy to understand. It is
generally accepted to explain corporate behaviour in terms of the economic
rationality of profit maximisation or returns on investments. One can make a
distinction between the short term pursuit of profits and the long term goal of
maintenance, which involves different attitudes towards investing in sustainable
development.
Different views are possible with respect to the issue whether social responsibility
and legal compliance are autonomous driving forces for corporate behaviour, or that
these motivations are derived from economic rationality, as such behaviour is based
on well understood self interest. According to a strict rational actor model, the motive
of legal compliance should be explained principally in terms of avoiding sanctions
for non-compliance and the liability to harm caused by the disturbance of possible
legal prosecution, plus the accompanying negative publicity and the damage to the
public image. So, the integration of legal compliance as an aim that fits in with the
corporate environmental strategy - common practice at least in the western world -
can be ascribed to these considerations to some extent. However, there is no evidence
that legal compliance in itself - the ethics of respecting the law - is no regular driving
force in many companies. A statement by an manager, quoted by SCHOT (1995:33),
can be used to illustrate the point: “Just because we are keeping regulations, it does
not mean that we agree with it or like it.”
The same can be said of social responsibility. Many companies claim that this is an
important driving force for their environmental policy. According to a strict rational
actor model, all environmentally related behaviour must be reduced to the material or
economic consequences for the firm, including the need for a stable relationship with
the social environment in order to survive as a company and to flourish. This would
imply the denial of any ethical base for corporate environmental management, which
would do no justice to the sincere dedication of many companies and in particular of
many individual employees and managers, who are truly dedicated to some way of
sustainable development. On the other hand, one should have no illusions about the
priorities when business and environmental considerations are not compatible.
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following ranking of “... reasons or motives (...) for the importance attached to
environmental protection...”:
1. ecological/social responsibility;
2. legislation/government regulation;
3. safeguarding of corporate viability/risk aspects;
4. image/public relations;
5. employee protection;
6. market pressure/market potentials/sales possibilities;
7. protection of the environment/quality of life;
8. value-adding potentials/revenue.
The items used by Steger can be conceived as specifications of the three basic driving
forces. Steger is a bit sceptical with respect to the ranking of ecological and social
responsibility as first, and mentions social desirable answers.
3.2 Corporate culture
A comprehensive discussion of the concept of corporate culture and the relation with
corporate environmental management is beyond the scope of this paper. Here
corporate culture is conceived in terms of environmental awareness. This involves
aspects such as sensitivity to requirements made by external stakeholders, shared
perceptions and values, and openness of decisionmaking procedures for
environmental considerations. CRANE (1995) describes “green cultures” in terms of
managerial rethorics versus truly shared perceptions and values, and argues that the
latter is hard to enact.
It is suggested here, that environmental awareness is not simply a unidimensional
concept of high versus low, but that at least three dimensions should be
distinguished, according to the three types of driving forces. With respect to
economic rationality, low environmental awareness means that a company is inclined
to perceive environmental issues as short term costs in stead of potential gains, while
high environmental awareness means that it is sensitive to market opportunities and
possible competitive advantages and is able to grasp them. With respect to legal
compliance the opposites can be characterised in terms of sensitivity to what
environmental agencies require from them, what to do to keep good relationships
with them, how to use the leeway for negotiating, and - perhaps most relevant - good
anticipating on future legal requirements. Social responsibility and environmental
awareness is a somewhat more complicated issue, although some indicators can be
mentioned here. Low environmental awareness means, for instance, that a company
is not able to assess the legitimacy of claims from external stakeholders in the eyes of
the general public, and is inclined to downplay requirements by environmental
organisations at the risk of considerable backlash, while high environmental
awareness means that it is able to create a positive and credible public image, to be
innovative and to benefit from it in economic respect. This issue is summarised in the
table below:
9ENVIRONMENTAL
AWARENESS
low level high level
economic rationality costs of measures market opportunities and
competitive advantages
legal compliance low sensibility to requirements
and available leeway
high sensitivity to
requirements and available
leeway, and anticipation to
future demands
social responsibility bad assessment of legitimacy
of claims, downplaying
requirements, and liable to
backlash
sensitive, good public image,
innovative, and able to benefit
from it
Table 1: Levels of environmental awareness and the three types of driving forces
3.3 Corporate responsiveness, environmental awareness and
driving forces
Corporate responsiveness is the extent to which a company is willing to reconcile the
requirements made by external stakeholders with its own purposes and to integrate
them in their environmental strategy. At this point is can be assumed that corporate
responsiveness to external stakeholders is dependent on two parameters: (1) the level
of environmental awareness, and (2) the type of driving force to which incentives
emitted by stakeholders are appealing. With respect to the former it is assumed that
there is a positive correlation between the level of environmental awareness and
corporate responsiveness. With respect to the latter, it is assumed that firms are likely
to develop a high level of environmental awareness with respect to economic
rationality, which is the primary driving force to nearly all companies. Next comes
legal compliance, and finally social responsibility (c.f. ARENTSEN, KLOK & SCHRAMA
1994).
This may be the regular, but it is not the necessary development path. One of the
companies studied by ARENTSEN, KLOK & SCHRAMA (1994) demonstrated a
remarkable combination of relatively high levels of environmental awareness with
respect to economic rationality and social responsibility and a rather low level of
environmental awareness with respect to legal compliance. The company had a
confrontation with the local environmental agency over non-compliance with a
number of rather insignificant requirements in its environmental permit, and was
treated with legal prosecution. The managers didn’t understand why they were
pictured as black sheep, while they lived up to high self-imposed standards with
respect to clean technologies and environmentally related market demands.
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4. External stakeholders
In this paper corporate environmental management is perceived in terms of reactions
on or anticipation of incentives from external stakeholders. The number of external
stakeholders to any company is large and diverse. In principle, a single individual can
act as external stakeholder, however, it often concerns formal organisations,
organised groupings, or associations. An external stakeholder is a third party, or its
representative, who’s interests are affected by specific aspects of the focal company’s
environmentally related behaviour, and who is able to transmit an incentive to this
company to protect this particular interest. Any party can be an external stakeholder
to a company regardless of the means and resources available to increase the weight
or the convincing power of this incentive. In contrary to other definitions (e.g. VAN
RIEMSDIJK 1994) an external stakeholder doesn’t need to be interested in the
continuity of the company, which is the case for a labour union, but not for an
environmental organisation.
Usually each external stakeholder has only interests in a limited number of corporate
environmental management aspects as discussed in the previous section. In this
section the most important types of external stakeholders are reviewed.
4.1 Government and environmental agencies
Government is not a single coherent organisational actor. It has many faces, and it
consists of many departments, institutions and agencies. Government is a collective
noun for a group of external stakeholders with slightly different interests at stake.
One perspective on government as stakeholder concerns its general responsibility for
environmental protection and sustainable development. In principle, each body of
government is charged with this responsibility for its own (territorial) jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, the formulation of general environmental policies is mainly the
competence of national governments and the European Union. Within public
environmental policies, an important place is taken by industry, as a major cause of
environmental problems and as an indispensable link in effective solutions. From this
perspective, government is concerned with direct environmental impacts as aspects
of corporate environmental management. The present European and national
environmental policies stress the need for industry to “internalise” the policy goals
and to contribute to the solution of environmental problems. For the European Union
this is formulated in the Fifth Environmental Action Plan “Towards Sustainability”,
notably chapter 4 on selected target groups and section 4.1 on industry (EUROPEAN
COMMISSION 1993a).
Individual companies come across government through the implementation of legal
regulation. As legislator, government has enacted a range of environmental laws in
which many demands are placed on companies. This involves: (1) direct regulation
of all kinds of environmentally related behaviour, such as the disposal of hazardous
waste; (2) certain activities are subject to environmental permits and these permits
contain additional legal requirements; (3) many products are subject to legal
regulation concerning its properties (automobiles are a notable example).
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Implementation, monitoring, control and enforcement are governmental tasks
performed by appointed legal authorities, such as lower levels of government or
environmental agencies. Interaction between companies and legal authorities are
concentrated on legal compliance as aspects of corporate environmental
management, rather than on direct environmental impacts. Over the years a shift has
occurred from prescription of means to prescription of goals; emission levels are
mentioned in the permits, rather than detailed descriptions of the technical means to
achieve them.
For dealing with the subject of public environmental policy with industry as target
group, policy sciences have supplied us with some conceptual framework. First, there
is the concept of policy style, which is an overall characterisation of the policy
formulation and the way the target group is approached. Pure types do not occur in
practise, but in a conceptual sense two dimensions are predominant: the consensus
base and the extent of self-regulation. A consensual policy style (c.f. RICHARDSON
1982) means that the policy formulation is based on consensus with the target groups.
The opposite is an impositional or hierarchical policy style, often referred to as
“command and control”. The other dimension refers to the steering models applied
(e.g. VAN DER DOELEN 1989; PRÖPPER & HERWEIJER 1992; GLASBERGEN 1994).
Regulation (a regulatory policy style) refers to the traditional juridical steering
model based on legal regulation. The opposite of regulation is self-regulation - which
is very much en vogue today. It does not mean that government remains passive and
refrains from steering. It is based on the idea that the target group should show the
desired behaviour without enforcement through legal regulation. Self-regulation can
be based on two steering models: economic or communicative. The economic
steering model is based on economic or market based policy instruments, which
involve economic incentives. Target group members should base their desicions on
their own calculations and there is no sanction on undesired behaviour. In its pure
form the communicative steering model refers to social coordination or steering
mechanisms, which do not require governmental interference, but can be activated or
stimulated by so-called communicative policy instruments. On the other hand,
communicative steering is often used to support other ways of steering, as steering
requires communication with the target group.
A similar approach is used by ARENTSEN & KÜNNEKE (1996) in their study of the
liberalisation of the electricity markets. The three allocation systems distinguished by
them correspond with the three steering models mentioned in this section.
4.2 Customers, suppliers and other partners in the product chains
Sustainability of industry is not just a matter of individual firms. It is of little use to
optimise sustainability within the firm without reference to the product chains: “from
cradle to grave”. Powerful actors in the chain, who strive for good environmental
records, often pose demands on their partners within product chains, first of all to
their suppliers. The best known example is perhaps the automotive industry, where
much effort is being spend on making their own products as “green” as possible. Due
to their huge market power, automobile manufacturers are more or less able to
impose trading conditions on their suppliers. This does not only concern the
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mechanical parts, but for instance also the plastics used in automobiles. Plastics
producers are not only urged to make sure that their products won’t cause any
problems in the disposal stage, but also to demonstrate that their own production
processes are environmentally sound. The formal status of supplier to an automobile
manufacturer is often conditional on the possession of official quality or
environmental certificates. Plastics producers on their turn impose similar demands
on their own suppliers (e.g. SCHRAMA 1997A; 1997B).
Most of the times, the customer is in a position to impose demands on the supplier,
but sometimes it is the other way around. Automobile manufacturers impose
demands on their retailers with respect to environmental management in their
workshops, just as franchise chains, such as McDonalds’, do to their contractors.
This is to prevent careless dealers and restaurant managers from harming the precious
corporate environmental images.
4.3 Consumers and end users
As external stakeholders, consumers and end users are part of the product chain, but
they have no direct contacts with the focal company. Environmental properties, in the
positive as well as the negative sense, are relevant selling points for products.
Consumers and end users may be guided by sustainability features of the products, or
by the health hazards involved in their use. For consumers the retail price is also an
argument. Dutch (!) experience shows that consumers are not really willing to pay
more for green products compared to conventional (less sustainable) alternatives.
Green consumerism is no big deal, but health hazards are a different story, especially
where it concerns food stuff. Meanwhile, budgetary neutral environmental
improvements, such as packaging of grocery’s or changes in detergents, have been
readily accepted by consumers in the past few years. However the market for
ecological products is still predominantly a niche market.
4.4 Financial institutions
Financial institutions, such as banks, insurance companies, and institutional
investors, are very powerful economic actors. It is assumed that they will act as
external stakeholders to corporate environmental management where their own
interests are involved. In the past few years, practitioners and academics have
attempted to make inventories of what is going on in the field of finance (e.g. THE
ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 1993; SCHRAMA & VERSTEGEN 1995; SCHRAMA &
SCHELLEMAN 1996; WHITE 1996; SCHMIDHEINY & ZORRAQUÍN 1996).
There are many indications that banks are getting more aware of the interests that are
at stake, and are developing corporate environmental policies to deal with it. The
international state of the art is presented in reports by THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE
UNIT (1993) and the United Nations Environment Programme (VAUGHAN 1995). The
UNEP (1995) has commissioned a “global survey on environmental policies and
practices of the financial services industry”, among 90 banks from all over the world.
Some remarkable findings of this survey are: (1) that seventy percent of the
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respondents believe that environmental issues have a material impact on their
business; (2) that over 80% of the banks perform some degree of environmental risk
management on the debt side of their business, while environmental issues appear to
play little role when it comes to equity financing; (3) that lender liability is the
greatest issue currently facing banks; and (4) that all respondents believe
environmental issues will receive more attention and become increasingly integrated
with their core business activities over the next fifteen years.
Although a defensive approach based on risk management prevails, some banks
decide to make public statements and to commit themselves to more pro-active
environmental policies. At the Rio conference in 1992 the UNEP has published “A
Statement by Banks on the Environment and Sustainable Development”. According
to this statement banks recognise a collective responsibility for sustainable
development and they accept the consequences for their own internal and external
environmental policies. The UNEP-statement is endorsed by 66 banks from all
continents (but none from the United States, and only one ethical bank from the
Netherlands).
The Netherlands are the home of three large international operating banks: ABN-
Amro, ING, and Rabo. The Dutch situation has been studied by SCHRAMA &
SCHELLEMAN (1996), including a series of interviews with key informants. They
distinguished three relevant fields: (1) environmental risk management, (2)
environmental related market opportunities, and (3) environmental aspects of the
mission and public image of banks.
With respect to risk management, Dutch banks clearly have developed a certain level
of environmental awareness. There are no big financial risks at stake, as lender
liability doesn’t apply to the Dutch situation. Before granting loans, most banks only
check upon clean soil certificates, environmental permits, and to the most obvious
environmental risks. No formal requirements are imposed on corporate clients with
respect to prevention of new environmental damage. More attention is paid to the
quality of environmental management, as part of an overall management assessment.
The approach chosen by the banks is pragmatically, aimed at the service of their own
interests and to a certain extent those of their clients. Attention to aspects of
environmental management is confined to the stage of decision making about
applications for loans and investments. It is not a regular item in the ongoing client
contacts. Moreover, attention to environmental aspects is predominantly related to
industrial enterprises and more in particular to traditional issues such as soil, water,
and air pollution.
All banks are involved in environmental related market opportunities, with a large
differentiation of activities. Three types can be distinguished. The first type concerns
additional financial services provided by banks to regular corporate clients. Financing
environmental investments means no additional business for banks. Around 1990 the
large banks have explored the area of supporting corporate environmental
management, but they consider this not as part of their business anymore. The second
type concerns the financing of environmental sectors. The large banks are involved in
the development and production of environmental technologies. They consider this as
regular business which has nothing to do with environmental policy. The smaller
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banks and one of the ethical banks have specialised in certain sectors that can be
characterised as application of environmental technology. The third type is
constituted by the green investment funds. Thanks to the 1995 fiscal measure, this is
a booming business in the Netherlands. These funds are important financial sources
for ecological projects, but no indications have been found that they have any effect
on environmental management practices in companies.
As banks are spending large sums to create favourable public images and goodwill of
potential customers and employees, the question is raised whether involvement in
environmental affairs and the resulting positive or negative publicity may constitute
an important aspect of the environmental policies of Dutch banks. No indications
have been found that - at this moment - much significance is attached by banks to this
issue, nor that banks are liable to client backlash with respect to environmental
affairs.
Insurance companies are external stakeholders to corporate environmental
management because they offer insurance coverage for environmental liabilities and
other kinds of damage related to environmental issues (c.f. SCHRAMA & VERSTEGEN
1995). Two main types are first party and third party liability. From a stakeholders
perspective third party environmental liabilities are the most relevant; damage to
others for which the policy holder is liable according to civil law. Environmental
damage may be damage to the environment (ecological damage), or damage through
the environment, which is material damage (to persons, goods or property, and loss
of income or profit) or immaterial damage (HAFKAMP ET AL 1994). Insurance
coverage for third party liability is not available for all environmental damage.
General restrictions concern negligence and offence of legal regulations. Moreover,
the event that has lead to the damage must have taken place after the insurance policy
had taken force, even if the damage has manifested or the claim is made afterwards.
Most Western European countries have a special insurance policy for third party
environmental liabilities, which is aimed at SME’s. These policies are restricted to
gradual environmental deterioration, and cover only economic damage (material
damage to companies). The most important application is soil contamination (BOS
1994). Actually, the most important types of environmental insurance are the general
corporate liability policies and the fire policies, which cover environmental damage
caused by specific events. Liabilities for employees, such as exposure to asbestos or
organic solvents, are also covered by general corporate liability policies, but these are
not considered to be environmental liabilities, nor are the various types of product
liability.
In the United States Superfund has caused much commotion, as many companies
have been held liable for clean-up costs of soil contamination, in particular caused by
waste disposal in landfills. These liabilities concerned not only landowners, but also
companies who have shipped their waste to these landfills, and also the financiers of
these companies (e.g. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT 1993; ).
In Europe the European Union has the intention of strict application of the polluter
pays principle to environmental damage, either through application of civil law, or
through special funds for which the potential perpetrators should supply the means
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION 1993b). Until now, fear of Superfund situations expressed
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by large corporations and financial institutions has hold up the final policy
formulation. Nevertheless with respect to environmental damage, an overall trend in
national legislation has been observed towards risk liability. This means that the
burden of proof is shifted from the injured party to the defendant (c.f. HAFKAMP ET
AL 1994).
First party liability concerns damage to the policy holder himself. With respect to
first party liabilities insurance companies are only external stakeholders to corporate
environmental management to the extent that their environmentally related behaviour
makes a difference. The big issue with respect to first party liability are the effects of
climate change, in particular the soaring claims for damage caused by natural
disasters. Although the connection with environmental issues is obvious, this
concerns no environmental insurance in the strict sense, nor does it make insurance
companies external stakeholders to individual firms. The insurance industry has
manifested itself after the 1995 UN Climate Conference in Berlin with a plea for
more effective measures against the greenhouse effect, while later that year the
UNEP Statement of Environmental Commitment was signed initially by 22 insurance
companies from all over the world. However, first party insurance coverage for
environmental damage in the strict sense is not generally available. In the
Netherlands the possibility of limited coverage of first party liability for soil
contamination is under preparation (c.f. WELWEZEN 1995).
Insurance companies as external stakeholders are faced with relatively large
uncertainties with respect to environmental liabilities. All regular means for
uncertainty reduction are applied: limited coverage, insurance pools (risk sharing)
and reinsurance (wholesale insurance). Nevertheless, insurance companies have
obvious interests in proper internal environmental care by their corporate clients in
order to minimise the changes of environmental damage. Compared to banks,
insurance companies are more inclined to impose preconditions with respect to
environmental management to their corporate clients. The Dutch environmental
liability policy, aimed at SME’s, includes the possibility of imposing annual
environmental audits, while environmental management systems are considered by
the branch. With respect to large companies there is no hard information available,
but informal communications indicate that impose very rigorous preconditions,
including extensive annual audits, notably in high risk branches as the chemical
industry and oil refineries.
4.5 Owners and shareholders
The involvement of owners and shareholders in companies is usually based on
economic rationality. As external stakeholders to corporate environmental
management it is assumed that they are primarily interested in the economic and
financial consequences. This doesn’t necessarily imply a short term perspective.
Sound environmental performance is more and more recognised as indicator of
economic performance (c.f. Johnson, cited in WHITE 1996). Notably in the case of
long term investments, which is the business of pension funds, there is a trend of
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using environmental indicators for long term economic performance (Keijzer in
SPRENGERS 1996).
Of course, owners and shareholders may also be guided by the driving forces of legal
compliance and social responsibility. This goes for natural persons, who choose not
to be ignorant about the destination of their savings, and for the so-called ethical or
green investment funds, which control large capitals (see e.g. for the UK RYALL &
RILEY 1996). Other large institutional investors, such as pension funds, who are
certainly no charities, often endorse ethical and sustainable principles (e.g. Simpson
as well as Keijzer in SPRENGERS 1996). Big companies, such as the Royal Dutch
Shell, are confronted with shareholder activism, often on the occasion of
environmental issues, since many years. For such activities the trend is away from ad
hoc actions towards a more institutionalised approach. Apart from activities by green
investment funds, this trend is supported in the UK by organisations such as the
Pension Investment Research Consultants (PIRC) and in the Netherlands by the
recently established Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO)
(SPRENGERS 1996).
CERES - the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies - is an initiative
developed by ethical investment funds and environmental groupings in the wake of
the Exxon Valdez disaster in 1989. They have developed the “Ceres Principles” a
code of good practice, which is said to be the most progressive and demanding of its
kind. In 1996, 81 companies, mainly from the US, had become signatories. Among
them are several from the Fortune 500 list, including General Motors (BORPHY
1996). Ten cases are reported of companies who have been proposed by shareholder
resolutions to endorse these principles, with on the average 10% of the shareholder
votes in favour of these proposals (Simpson in SPRENGERS 1996).
4.6 Peer companies and trade associations
Peer companies and trade associations are no obvious external stakeholders, but
nevertheless they often act as such through branch activities in support of
environmental management within companies. This can be explained from reasons of
efficiency, when cooperation at the branch level may prevent individual companies
from inventing the wheel over and over again, while there is also a silent code of
banning competition on environmental issues. In the Netherlands, trade associations
are important intermediaries for the proliferation of environmental management
systems, especially among SME’s. Government is constructing networks around
them for this purpose (cf. DE BRUIJN & LULOFS 1996; RADERSMA & SCHRAMA 1996).
Another consideration is that a single “black sheep” may harm the public image of
the whole branch. Notably the chemical and oil refinery industries have been under
public scrutiny quite often and have spend much money for improvement of their
environmental images (apart from investments in tangible environmental
improvements). In the UK, the Chemical Industries Association has developed the
Responsible Care Programme, which is not only aimed at high levels of protection of
health, safety and environment, but also at regaining trust and credibility for the
industry (e.g. SIMMONS & WYNNE 1993). Finally, the advantage of cooperation is
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that frontrunners are kept in check, and are protected from too large risks, while free
riders are not rewarded.
Cooperation of companies within branches or wider frameworks can be conceived in
terms of individual firms with mutual interests, but this is not the whole story. Much
developments towards greening of industry taken place at collective levels, not only
the branches of industry, but also international business fora and international (semi-
governmental) organisations that are very active in the fields of sustainable
development, such as UNEP, OECD, or World Bank (e.g. SCHOT 1995). Well known
initiatives, apart from CERES and the Responsible Care Programme, are for instance
the Business Charter for Sustainable Development developed by the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (e.g. BORPHY 1996), and the Declaration of the
Business Council for Sustainable development (SCHMIDHEINY 1992). Companies are
invited to join these initiatives by undersigning a declaration. By doing this the
commit themselves publicly to a code of conduct in which they acknowledge a
certain responsibility for sustainable development and certain implications for their
environmentally related behaviour. Critics say - not without reason - that these
declarations contain no real obligations; some involve a commitment to public
reporting, but only the Ceres Principles involve submission to independent audits.
4.7 Environmental organisations
No’s are organisations who act in the general interest. Environmental organisations
stand up for environmental protection and sustainable development, while
concentrating on specific issues or particular geographical areas. In this quality they
are external stakeholders for certain companies. In principle they address companies
on the driving force of social responsibility. The establishing and sustaining of
contacts with companies is supported by the spreading of information, preferably
through mass media, and the acting upon public opinion. Environmental
organisations can have much power over companies, as they may cause big economic
harm to them through their actions, in extreme cases by organising consumer
boycotts, in general by affecting the company’s public image. The big problem is that
environmental organisation have hardly any control over their own weapons, and are
unable to deploy them proportionally. The events around the oil platform the Brent
Spar in 1995 have surprised Greenpeace almost as much as Shell. Companies on
their turn don’t know exactly how to deal with socially sensitive issues. It is obvious
that the real big issues must be recognised in an early stage; disregarding or
downplaying can easily become fatal. But how should a company know which of
those numerous potentially relevant issues must be treated seriously? It seems that
some companies are more sensitive to make the right choices than others. Certain
companies - such as Shell - are compromised quite often, and this is not just a matter
of performing such harmful activities. It might as well be a matter of corporate
culture.
In the past few years, more multinationals have come under public scrutiny because
of ethical issues. This is often explained as the result of the changing role of
government (steering at distance), or the reduced governmental ability for social
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control. Previously government was more often addressed for solving the problems
caused by the external effects of corporate behaviour, now social groupings rather
address the company involved directly. Previously government used to provide social
structures for dimming the problems, now the chances of escalation, in the sense of
attention in mass media and public response, are greater. As a result, companies have
a growing need for structural contacts with environmental organisations, and
environmental multinationals, such as Greenpeace are increasingly willing to meet
these wishes (such as the recent agreement reached by Greenpeace with Shell and
Texaco). Last year, HERKSTRÖTER (1996), president of Shell, has admitted in a
remarkable speech, that Shell has made certain misjudgements with respect to
providing public information about environmental issues, and that they did not
recognise in time important transformations in social structures, a shift of authority
from government to environmental and consumer organisations.
The question remains, how to judge these developments. Environmental
organisations are treated more or less as representatives of society, but they lack the
time honoured democratic control structures of (western) governments. Established
environmental organisations risk to loose public support when they commit
themselves to the environmental policies of multinationals (c.f. VAN RIEMSDIJK
1994; 1996).
4.8 Employees and trade unions
Employees - and trade unions or workers committees as their representatives - are
stakeholders foremost with respect to labour conditions, notably safety and health
hazards. Usually the safeguarding of health, safety and environment are mutually
compatible. The relevant staff functions are often integrated into so-called HSE
departments. Labour conditions are important issues to industrial labour unions, and
most companies are well aware of the importance of keeping employees satisfied in
this respect.
4.9 Local residents
Local residents are obvious external stakeholders to corporate environmental
management, because of the nuisance caused by the regular operations, and because
of the safety and health hazards stemming from the presence of these companies in
their surroundings. Their big problem is to find sufficient power in support of their
interests, which is often a matter of building a strong organisation. When problems
arise, local residents usually have the sympathy and support of environmental
organisations and local authorities. Serious complaints by local residents are often
occasions for enforcement of compliance to legal standards in cases where offences
were tolerated by environmental agencies before (e.g. two cases in ARENTSEN, KLOK
& SCHRAMA 1994).
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4.10 erceptions of stakeholders’ pressure
The external stakeholders perspective is a regular approach of the topic of corporate
environmental management. Nevertheless there are not many comprehensive
empirical studies available of the way pressure from external stakeholders is
perceived by companies. One study with corporate respondents from 25 UK firms,
performed in 1991, is reported by WILLIAMS, MEDHURST & DREW (1993). The
following stakeholder pressures are mentioned, ranked by decreasing relevance:
• Government: environmental legislation is perceived as the most powerful
pressure, although firms are only affected by it to the extent to which it is
enforced.
• Local communities: a small number of companies is severely affected by pressure
from the local community and has accommodated its behaviour.
• Customers are presently not perceived to be a source of environmental pressure,
although in some case they are perceived to be a future pressure.
• Suppliers of raw materials are perceived to be an environmental pressure when
they pass on price increases as a result of higher environmental costs.
• Employees and trade unions are not perceived to be exerting pressure for
improvements in environmental performance.
• Investors are not perceived to be exerting pressure for improvements in
environmental performance, and only a small number of firms are aware of this as
a possible future issue, for instance with respect to possible soil contamination of
their sites.
5. Corporate responsiveness
In this paper some building stones for a theoretical framework for analysing the
relationships between companies and external stakeholders are brought up. The
dependent variable is corporate responsiveness, and four parameters have been
mentioned:
• the specific aspects of corporate environmental management that affects the
interests of particular stakeholders;
• the nature of the incentives enacted by the external stakeholders, in particular the
type of the company’s motivational driving force to which they are appealing;
• the extent of the company’s environmental consciousness corresponding to the
type of driving force addressed by the external stakeholders;
• the mutual dependencies in the relationship between the company and its external
stakeholders.
In this paper corporate environmental management is perceived in terms of reaction
on or anticipation of incentives emitted by external stakeholders. Corporate
responsiveness is the extent to which a company is willing to reconcile the
requirements made by external stakeholders with its own purposes and to integrate
them in their environmental strategy.
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• Action undertaken by external stakeholders may be provoked by considerations of
environmental protection and aimed at specific aspects of corporate environmental
management which are directly related to environmental impacts, but they may as
well be oriented at other considerations and aimed at aspects of internal
environmental management, or at so-called “side-effects”.
• Incentives by external stakeholders are addressed at specific driving forces.
Ceteris paribus, the odds of appealing at economic rationality are better than those
of appealing at legal regulation, while the odds of appealing at social
responsibility are the worst.
• Environmental awareness has three aspects, corresponding with the three types of
driving forces. Ceteris paribus, the extent of corporate responsiveness varies with
the levels of environmental awareness corresponding with the driving forces to
which an appeal is made.
• The extent of corporate responsiveness varies with the company’s perceptions of
their dependence on the external stakeholders concerned.
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